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Two	Continents,	Divided	by	Deep	Philosophical	Waters?		Why	
Geographical	Indications	Pose	a	Challenge	to	the	Completion	of	the	
Transatlantic	Trade	and	Investment	Partnership		
Benjamin	Farrand1	
	
I.	Introduction	
	The	May	2016	 leak	of	draft	 texts	produced	within	 the	context	of	 the	on-going	Transatlantic	Trade	and	 Investment	Partnership	negotiations	has	provided	an	 interesting	 insight	 into	 the	positions	of	the	EU	and	US	with	regard	to	different	dimensions	of	regulatory	cooperation,	with	some	chapters	being	complete	or	near	completion	(as	other	articles	 in	this	mini-symposium	discuss),	and	others	still	in	a	more	rudimentary	format.		One	such	field	of	regulation,	covered	in	the	leaked	‘Tactical	State	of	Play’	document,	covers	geographical	indicators	(hereafter	GIs).		However,	this	coverage	is	very	brief,	stating	that	‘discussions	focused	on	the	preparation	of	an	intersessional	 discussion	prior	 to	 the	next	 round’2.	 	 GIs,	marks	 identifying	 the	 geographical	origin,	 and	 by	 extension	 (so	 the	 argument	 goes)	 quality	 of	 goods,	 have	 continued	 to	 be	 a	source	of	consternation	in	international	trade	regulation,	with	states	unable	to	see	eye-to-eye	on	 how	 they	 should	 be	 protected,	 if	 at	 all.	 	 The	 EU	 and	 US	 in	 particular	 reflect	 two	 very	different	 philosophical	 approaches	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 GI,	 and	 its	 application	 to	 foods	 in	particular3.	 	 For	 the	 EU,	 cheeses	 such	 as	 Feta	 are	 culturally	 and	 geographically	 distinct,	attributable	 to	a	certain	region	within	Greece4,	with	a	 long,	established	history.	 	For	 the	US,	feta	is	a	generic	type	of	‘white’	cheese,	and	not	deserving	of	special	recognition.		As	this	paper	will	demonstrate,	 the	 substantially	different	 conceptions	of	GIs,	 combined	with	 two	distinct	regulatory	approaches	being	exported	through	other	trade	agreements	by	both	the	EU	and	US,	appear	to	render	the	negotiating	positions	of	the	two	regions	incompatible.		The	impact	of	this	
																																																								1	Assistant	Professor,	University	of	Warwick,	contactable	at	b.farrand@warwick.ac.uk.		The	author	would	like	to	thank	the	reviewers	for	their	helpful	comments	and	advice	in	redrafting	this	article.	2	Greenpeace	Netherlands	TTIP	Leak,	‘Note	-	Tactical	State	of	Play	of	the	TTIP	Negotiations’	(2016)	at	p.21.	3	It	 must	 be	 stated	 that	 there	 are	 specific	 additional	 regimes	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 wines	 and	 spirits	 –	 in	 the	interests	of	brevity,	and	to	focus	on	this	core	issue	of	controversy,	these	additional	regimes	are	not	considered	here.	4	Feta	being	the	name	for	a	traditional	cheese	produced	in	Greece	since	 ‘ancient	times’,	using	either	ewe’s	milk	exclusively,	 or	 a	 mixture	 of	 ewe	 and	 goat	 milk,	 as	 per	 Regulation	 No	 1829/2002	 amending	 the	 Annex	 to	Regulation	(EC)	No	1107/96	with	regard	to	the	name	‘Feta’	
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may	be	that	GIs	are	excluded	from	the	scope	of	TTIP,	or	that	TTIP	may	fail	to	be	concluded	at	all.	
	
II.	Geographical	indications	as	a	source	of	conflict	between	the	EU	and	US	
	A	GI	is	a	sui	generis	form	of	intellectual	property	right,	concerned	with	identifying	a	good	as	originating	 in	 a	 specific	 country,	 territory	 or	 locality5.	 	 First	 given	 specific	 definition	 in	international	 trade	 rules	 under	 the	 Agreement	 on	 Trade-Related	 Aspects	 of	 Intellectual	Property	Rights	 (hereafter	TRIPS),	 this	 identification	 is	 of	 relevance	 ‘where	 a	 given	quality,	reputation	 or	 other	 characteristic	 of	 the	 good	 is	 essentially	 attributable	 to	 its	 geographical	origin’6.	 	 For	 Blakeney,	 the	 novelty	 of	 a	 GI	 comes	 in	 the	 explicit	 linkage	 of	 the	 concept	 of	geography	to	that	of	quality7,	 the	 idea	that	a	particular	 location,	soil,	climate	or	type	of	vine	will	 influence	the	quality	of	produced	agricultural	goods,	whether	they	be	meats,	cheeses	or	grains.	 	 Recognition	 of	 a	 GI,	 it	 would	 therefore	 follow,	 relies	 upon	 accepting	 the	 initial	presumption	that	these	geographical	factors,	as	well	as	developed	knowledge	of	techniques	of	preparation	 and	 production	 do	 indeed	 influence	 the	 quality	 of	 those	 goods.	 	 The	 idea	 of	attaching	 specific	 qualities	 to	 produce	 of	 a	 particular	 region	 is	 by	 no	 means	 new,	 with	examples	 dating	 back	 to	 Egypt’s	 Old	 Kingdom	 and	 the	 Ancient	 Greek	 city-states8.	 	 Their	inclusion	within	TRIPS	as	a	form	of	intellectual	property	right,	however,	was.		While	reference	to	appellations	of	origin	is	made	in	the	Paris	Convention	of	1883,	and	the	Lisbon	Agreement	of	1958	does	make	specific	reference	to	GIs9,	 it	was	only	with	TRIPS	in	the	mid	1990s	that	the	concept	of	a	geographical	indicator	became	recognised	as	a	legal	right	with	effective	dispute	settlement10.	 	 Yet	 when	 compared	 to	 the	more	 considerable	 harmonisation	 of	 patents	 and	trademarks,	the	TRIPS	provisions	on	GIs	dictate	little	substantively,	allowing	states	to	choose	
																																																								5	Bernard	 O’Connor,	 ‘The	 Legal	 Protection	 of	 Geographical	 Indications’	 Intellectual	 Property	 Quarterly	 (2004)	pp.35	et	seqq,	at	p.35.	6	TRIPS,	Article	22(1)	7	Michael	Blakeney,	‘Geographical	Indications:	What	Do	They	Indicate?’	6	WIPO	Journal	(2014)	pp.50	et	seqq,	at	p.50.	8	Vadim	Mantrov,	EU	Law	on	Indications	of	Geographical	Origin:	Theory	and	Practice	 (Berlin:	 Springer	2014)	at	p.32.	9	Although	it	must	be	stated	that	membership	of	this	agreement	is	low,	limiting	upon	its	international	impact,	as	indicated	 by	 Justine	 Pila	 and	 Paul	 Torremans,	European	 Intellectual	 Property	 Law	 (Oxford:	 OUP	 2016)	 p.469;	William	 A	 Kerr,	 ‘Enjoying	 a	 Good	 Port	 with	 a	 Clear	 Conscience:	 Geographic	 Indicators,	 Rent	 Seeking	 and	Development’	in	William	A	Kerr	(ed),	Conflict,	Chaos	and	Confusion	(Cheltenham:	Edward	Elgar	Publishing	2010)	p.88.	10	See	Kerr	(n	6)	p.88.	
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for	themselves	the	specific	means	of	protection	under	Article	22(2)11.		Described	by	Ganjee	as	constituting	 an	 ‘unstable	 compromise’12,	 the	 minimally	 harmonised	 nature	 of	 GIs	 at	 the	international	level	is	the	result	of	significant	conflicts	between	states	regarding	the	legitimacy,	and	indeed	necessity,	of	their	protection.		Whereas	much	of	the	discussion	of	TRIPS	relates	to	the	 ‘global	 North-global	 South’	 conflict13,	 particularly	 as	 concerns	 issues	 such	 as	 access	 to	medicines14,	the	protection	of	GIs	can	be	conceptualised	as	a	conflict	between	the	‘Old	World’	and	‘New	World’15.	 	As	Sanders	puts	it,	there	‘is	not	a	single	IP	right	that	has	so	consistently	led	to	heated	debates	in	international	trade	other	than	GIs’16;	this	debate	can	be	understood	in	terms	of	the	significant	divergences	in	perception	of	the	role	of	GIs	in	international	trade,	and	subsequently	the	ways	in	which	they	are	protected	in	the	IP	system.		In	order	to	demonstrate	how	 this	 may	 negatively	 impact	 upon	 the	 likelihood	 of	 successful	 TTIP	 negotiations,	 it	 is	necessary	to	consider	the	competing	narratives	over	GIs	in	the	EU	and	US.			GI	protection	has	been	afforded	a	key	role	 in	 the	EU’s	agricultural	policies17,	particularly	as	they	 relate	 to	 external	 market	 relations	 with	 other	 states	 and	 their	 respective	 consumer	bases18.		GIs	are	perceived	to	promote	the	cultural	heritage	of	the	EU	Member	States,	linking	issues	 of	 trade	 to	 issues	 of	 authenticity	 and	 traditional	 knowledge19,	 as	 well	 as	 serving	 an	additional	 goal	 of	 promoting	 the	 EU’s	 agricultural	 regions	 economically,	 penetrating	 new																																																									11	On	 this	 point	 see	 Gail	 E	 Evans,	 ‘The	 Protection	 of	 Geographical	 Indications	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 and	 the	United	 States	 under	 Sui	 Generis	 and	 Trade	 Mark	 Systems:	 Signs	 of	 Harmonization?’	 Intellectual	 Property	Quarterly	(2013)	pp.18	et	seqq,	p.20;	Antony	Taubman,	Hannu	Wager	and	Jayashree	Watal	(eds),	A	Handbook	on	
the	WTO	TRIPS	Agreement	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press	2012)	pp.77–78.	12	Dev	Gangjee,	Relocating	 the	Law	of	Geographical	 Indications	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	University	 Press	 2012)	p.184.	13	See	 for	 example	 Peter	 Drahos	 and	 John	 Braithwaite,	 Information	 Feudalism:	 Who	 Owns	 the	 Knowledge	
Economy?	(Abingdon:	Earthscan	2002);	Carlos	María	Correa	and	Abdulqawi	Yusuf	(eds),	Intellectual	Property	and	
International	Trade:	The	TRIPs	Agreement	(Aalphen	aan	den	Rijn:	Kluwer	Law	International	2008).	14	FM	Scherer	and	Jayashree	Watal,	‘Post-TRIPS	Options	for	Access	to	Patented	Medicines	in	Developing	Nations’	5	Journal	of	International	Economic	Law	(2002)	pp.913	et	seqq.	15	Taubman,	Wager	and	Watal	(n	8)	p.77.	16	Anselm	K	Sanders,	‘Geographical	Indications	of	Origin:	When	GIs	Become	Commodities,	All	Gloves	Come	off’	46	International	Review	of	Intellectual	Property	and	Competition	Law	(2015)	pp.755	et	seqq,	p.755;	see	also	Meir	Perez	Pugatch,	 ‘Intellectual	Property	Policy-Making	 in	 the	21st	Century’	3	WIPO	 Journal	 (2011)	pp.71	et	seqq,	p.72;	Tim	Josling,	‘The	War	on	Terroir:	Geographical	Indications	as	a	Transatlantic	Trade	Conflict’	57	Journal	of	Agricultural	Economics	(2006)	pp.337	et	seqq,	pp.339–340.	17	O’Connor	 (n	 2)	 p.35;	 Luisa	 Menapace	 and	 others,	 ‘Consumers’	 Preferences	 for	 Geographical	 Origin	 Labels:	Evidence	from	the	Canadian	Olive	Oil	Market’	38	European	Review	of	Agricultural	Economics	(2011)	pp.193	et	
seqq.	18	Andreas	 Dür,	 ‘Bringing	 Economic	 Interests	 Back	 into	 the	 Study	 of	 EU	 Trade	 Policy-Making’	 10	 The	 British	Journal	of	Politics	&	International	Relations	(2008)	pp.27	et	seqq,	p.35.	19	Tesh	W	Dagne,	‘Beyond	Economic	Considerations:	(Re)conceptualising	Geographical	Indications	for	Protecting	Traditional	Agricultural	Products’	46	International	Review	of	Intellectual	Property	and	Competition	Law	(2015)	pp.682	et	seqq,	pp.684–685;	Matteo	Ferrari,	‘The	Narratives	of	Geographical	Indications’	10	International	Journal	of	the	Law	in	Context	(2014)	pp.222	et	seqq,	p.225.	
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markets	 for	 EU	 produce20.	 	 For	 the	 EU,	 goods	 protected	 by	 a	 GI	 constitute	 a	 useful	 ‘value-added’	 regime,	with	 the	 consumer	 perceptions	 of	 increased	 quality	 through	 originality	 and	speciality21	meaning	 that	 higher	 prices	 can	 be	 afforded	 to	 such	 products22.	 	 According	 to	 a	2012	 report	 commissioned	by	 the	European	Commission,	 the	value	of	 sales	of	GI-protected	foodstuffs	 (excluding	 wines	 and	 spirits)	 was	 €15.8	 billion	 with	 an	 increase	 in	 sale	 value	between	2005	and	2010	of	19%23.		Due	to	their	value	(and	indeed	the	EU’s	prime	position	to	maximise	 the	 international	 recognition	 of	 foods	 such	 as	mozzarella	di	 bufala	and	 jamón	de	
serón)	 EU	 protection	 afforded	 to	 GIs	 is	 particularly	 broad.	 	 The	 2012	 Quality	 Schemes	Regulation24	reflects	 these	 perceptions	 regarding	 the	 role	 of	 GIs,	 stating	 their	 existence	 is	necessary	 to	 both	 raise	 commercial	 awareness	 of	 these	 high-quality	 products,	 as	 well	 as	achieve	rural	development	policy	objectives25.		To	gain	Protected	Geographic	Indicator	(PGI)	status,	Article	5(2)	states	that	only	the	one	of	the	production	steps	for	that	good26	need	take	place	 in	 that	 geographical	 area27,	 allowing	 for	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 products	 to	 be	 afforded	protection.	 	While	 Article	 6	 specifies	 that	 a	 term	 that	 is	 considered	 generic	 cannot	 receive	protection,	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	 Court	 indicates	 that	 this	 is	 a	 comparatively	 low	 barrier	 to	surmount,	with	Feta	cheese	 gaining	 protected	 status,	 contrary	 to	 arguments	 that	 the	 name	was	 considered	 generic	 by	 consumers	 in	 the	EU,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	name	Feta	refers	to	a	cutting	technique	rather	than	a	geographical	location28.		Rather	than	promoting	luxury	agricultural	products,	however,	critics	of	the	EU	GI	regime,	and	in	particular	‘New	World’	producers	such	as	the	US	and	Australia,	consider	it	to	be	a	form	of	market	 protectionism29,	 or	 in	 the	words	 of	 one	US	 Commerce	Department	 official,	 ‘nothing	
																																																								20	Ferrari	(n	16)	p.225;	O’Connor	(n	2)	p.36.	21	For	more	on	this	see	Menapace	and	others	(n	14).	22	Arete	 Research	 &	 Consulting	 in	 Economics,	 ‘Study	 on	 Assessing	 the	 Added	 Value	 of	 PDO/PGI	 Products’	(Commissioned	by	the	European	Commission	2013)	pp.5–6.	23	Tanguy	Chever	and	others,	 ‘Value	of	Production	of	Agricultural	Products	and	Foodstuffs,	Wines,	Aromatised	Wines	and	Spirits	Protected	by	a	Geographical	Indication’	(European	Commission	2012)	p.16.	24	Regulation	No	1151/2012	on	quality	schemes	for	agricultural	products	and	foodstuffs	25	Ibid,	Article	1	26	Defined	in	Article	3(7)	as	processing,	production	and	packaging	27	Although	 for	 the	 stronger	Protected	Designation	of	Origin	 (PDO)	protection,	 all	 three	 steps	must	 take	place	within	that	area.	28	Joined	 cases	C-465/02	and	C-466/02	Federal	Republic	of	Germany	and	Kingdom	of	Denmark	v	Commission	of	
the	European	Communities	EU:C:2005:636	29	Kal	Raustiala	and	Stephen	R	Munzer,	‘The	Global	Struggle	over	Geographic	Indications’	18	European	Journal	of	International	Law	(2007)	pp.337	et	seqq,	p.351.	
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less	 than	a	subsidy	of	European	agriculture	 interests	 through	claw	back	of	generic	 terms’30.		Furthermore,	critics	in	the	US	dispute	the	inherent	linking	of	geography	with	quality,	noting	that	waves	of	immigration	to	the	US	from	Europe	resulted	in	the	‘know-how’	of	many	of	these	traditional	 foods	 being	 transferred	 and	 applied	 in	 US	 territory,	 resulting	 in	 the	 same	processing	and	production	methods31.		Instead	of	a	broad	sui	generis	regime,	the	US	protects	GIs	generally	as	a	discrete	 subcategory	of	 its	 trademark	 laws32,	 as	 certification	or	collective	marks	 under	 the	 Lanham	Act33.	 	 A	 certification	mark	 allows	 for	 a	 certain	mark	 to	 be	 used	subject	to	certain	specifications,	which	can	include	production	methods	and	places	of	origin34,	or	 even	 as	 a	 trademark	 where	 the	 geographic	 terms	 used	 have	 acquired	 distinctiveness	through	 consumer	 identification	 of	 those	 terms	 with	 a	 particular	 company	 or	 producer35.		Furthermore,	 the	 US	 is	 stricter	 than	 the	 EU	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 determining	 whether	 a	particular	product	is	generic,	and	so	ineligible	for	trademark,	certification	or	collective	mark	protection36 ;	 whereas	 parmigiano	 reggiano	 is	 a	 protected	 GI	 in	 the	 EU,	 ‘parmesan’	 is	considered	a	generic	 in	 the	US,	referring	to	a	hard,	aged	cheese37.	 	The	US	considers	the	EU	approach	to	GIs	to	be	unnecessarily	broad,	arguing	that	trademark	law	is	sufficient	to	protect	these	goods,	while	preventing	overreach	when	considering	generic	 terms38.	 	US	agricultural	producers	 in	particular	 are	opposed	 to	 the	EU	 sui	generis	system,	 considering	 it	 a	potential	threat	to	their	own	business	interests39.		The	US	is	particularly	concerned	that	the	EU	grants	priority	to	the	sui	generis	GI	over	trademarks,	preventing	the	registration	of	a	trademark	that	may	 conflict	 with	 a	 pre-existing	 GI40,	 and	 being	 permitted	 to	 co-exist	 with	 a	 pre-existing	trademark	in	the	event	that	the	application	for	a	GI	is	filed	subsequent	to	a	successful,	good-
																																																								30	As	quoted	 in	Molly	Torsen,	 ‘Apples	and	Oranges	 (and	Wine):	Why	 the	 International	Conversation	Regarding	Geographic	 Indications	Is	at	a	Standstill’	87	Journal	of	 the	Patent	and	Trademark	Society	(2005)	pp.31	et	seqq,	p.52.	31	Blakeney	(n	4)	p.52.	32	Evans	(n	8)	p.23.	33	The	Lanham	(Trademark)	Act	15	USC	§	1054	34	Josling	(n	13)	p.347.	35	ibid.	36	Evans	(n	8)	p.26.	37	ibid.	38	Michael	 Blakeney,	 ‘Scope	 of	 the	 Intellectual	 Property	 Chapter	 of	 the	 Trans-Pacific	 Partnership	 Agreement	(TPPA)’	 21	 International	 Trade	 Law	&	Regulation	 (2015)	 pp.14	 et	 seqq,	 p.16;	 see	 also	Dwijen	Rangnekar	 and	Sanjay	Kumar,	‘Another	Look	at	Basmati:	Genericity	and	the	Problems	of	a	Transborder	Geographical	Indication’	13	The	Journal	of	World	Intellectual	Property	(2010)	pp.202	et	seqq.	39	Dermot	J	Hayes,	Sergio	H	Lence	and	Bruce	Babcock,	‘Geographic	Indications	and	Farmer-Owned	Brands:	Why	Do	the	US	and	EU	Disagree?’	4	EuroChoices	(2005)	pp.28	et	seqq.	40	Regulation	No	1151/2012,	Article	14(1)	
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faith	 trademark	 registration41.	 	 As	 well	 as	 representing	 a	 substantial	 incompatibility	 in	economic	interests,	the	conflict	between	the	EU	and	US	also	reflects	an	incompatibility	in	the	philosophical	 and	 legal	 approaches	 to	 the	protection	of	GIs42,	which	may	have	considerable	implications	for	TTIP.		
III.	International	manoeuvring	and	norm	exportation:	divergences	in	the	protection	of	
geographical	indicators	in	regional	trade	agreements	
	The	EU	and	US	have	been	engaged	in	the	formulation	of	other	trade	agreements	in	addition	to	the	TTIP	negotiations,	 in	which	 they	have	 sought	 to	 implement	 their	 respective	norms	 and	legal	 approaches	 to	 GIs,	 creating	 an	 atmosphere	 of	 regulatory	 competition.	 	 The	 US	 has	recently	 agreed	 the	 final	 text	 of	 the	 Trans	 Pacific	 Partnership,	 a	 comprehensive	 trade	agreement	 between	 the	 US,	 Australia,	 Brunei,	 Canada,	 Chile,	 Japan,	 Malaysia,	 Mexico,	 New	Zealand,	 Peru,	 Singapore	 and	 Vietnam.	 	 Chapter	 18	 of	 this	 agreement	 concerns	 intellectual	property	 rights,	 including	 trademarks	and	GIs.	 	The	position	of	 the	US	 is	made	clear	by	 the	chapter	 summary	 provided	 by	 the	 Office	 of	 the	 United	 States	 Trade	 Representative,	 which	states	 that	 the	 intention	 of	 TPP	 in	 this	 regulatory	 sector	 is	 to	 ‘address	 the	 potential	 for	inappropriately	“overprotecting”	GIs	in	ways	that	shut	out	US	agricultural	and	food	producers,	including	[…how	to]	determine	whether	a	term	is	generic	in	its	market’43.		The	US	preference	for	 protection	within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 trademark	 system	 is	 apparent	 under	Article	 18.19,	which	 concerns	 collective	 and	 certification	marks.	 	 This	Article	 states	 that	 each	party	 ‘shall	also	provide	 that	 signs	 that	may	serve	as	GIs	are	capable	of	protection	under	 its	 trademark	system’.	 	 While	 Article	 18.30	 states	 that	 GIs	 may	 also	 be	 protected	 through	 a	 sui	 generis	system,	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 EU	 regime,	 strict	 limitations	 are	 placed	 upon	 its	 operation.		Article	18.32(1)	outlines	the	grounds	of	opposition	to	a	grant	of	a	GI,	which	can	take	place	if	it	would	 cause	 confusion	with	 a	 trademark	 that	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 a	pre-existing	 application	or	registration,	 it	would	cause	confusion	with	a	pre-existing	mark	granted,	or	 the	GI	 is	a	 ‘term	customary	in	common	language	as	the	common	name	for	the	relevant	good’	in	that	territory.																																																										41	Ibid,	 Article	 14(2);	 see	 also	WTO	Disputes	WT/DS/174	 and	WT/DS/290	EC	 -	Protection	of	Trademarks	and	
Geographical	Indications	for	Agricultural	Products	and	Foodstuffs	(2005)			42 	See	 also	 Cerkia	 Bramley,	 Delphine	 Marie-Vivien	 and	 Estelle	 Biénabe,	 ‘Considerations	 in	 Designing	 an	Appropriate	 Legal	 Framework	 for	 GIs	 in	 Southern	 Countries’	 in	 Cerkia	 Bramley,	 Estelle	 Bienabe	 and	 Johann	Kirsten	 (eds),	 Developing	 Geographical	 Indications	 in	 the	 South	 (Berlin:	 Springer	 2013);	 Stephan	 Marette,	Roxanne	 Clemens	 and	 Bruce	 Babcock,	 ‘Recent	 International	 and	 Regulatory	 Decisions	 about	 Geographical	Indications’	24	Agribusiness	(2008)	pp.453	et	seqq.	43	Office	of	the	United	States	Trade	Representative,	‘Intellectual	Property	Chapter	Summary’	(2015)	p.3.	
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Article	18.32(2)	states	that	these	grounds	for	opposition	can	also	be	used	as	the	grounds	for	the	cancellation	of	an	existing	GI,	indicating	that	the	position	of	the	US	is	that	trademarks	have	prime	position	in	the	intellectual	property	regime44.	 	Calboli	has	referred	to	this	as	a	‘first	in	time,	first	 in	right’	approach	to	registration,	 in	which	a	new	GI	cannot	be	used	to	supplant	a	pre-existing	 trademark45	–	however,	 the	 fact	 that	 a	GI	 can	be	cancelled	 on	 the	 grounds	of	 a	competing	mark	suggests	this	goes	beyond	‘first	in	time,	first	in	right’	to	afford	trademarks	a	higher	 standard	 of	 protection	 than	GIs.	 	 The	 approach	 in	TPP	mirrors	 that	 of	 the	US-South	Korea	Free	Trade	Agreement,	which	specifies	at	Article	18.2(2)	that	GIs	are	to	be	protected	as	trademarks,	 and	 that	 trademark	 holders	 can	 prevent	 the	 use	 by	 other	 economic	 actors	 of	‘identical	or	similar	signs,	including	GIs’	at	Article	18.2(4).	 	It	becomes	quickly	apparent	that	the	 US	 position	 is	 that	 GIs	 should	 be	 protected	 at	 the	 international	 level	 as	 a	 category	 of	trademark,	rather	than	under	a	sui	generis	system.		The	 EU,	 in	 comparison,	 is	 rapidly	 exporting	 its	 norms	 and	 laws	 through	 its	 own	 trade	agreements.	 	 In	 the	 finalised	 Comprehensive	 Economic	 and	 Trade	 Agreement	 (CETA)	negotiated	with	Canada,	 the	EU	has	ensured	that	 its	definition	of	GIs	as	part	of	a	sui	generis	system	of	protection	is	reproduced	in	Article	20.16,	including	a	list	of	protected	EU-based	GIs	in	 Annex	 20-A.	 	 Furthermore,	 CETA	 grants	 priority	 to	 the	 sui	 generis	GIs	 over	 trademarks,	stating	 in	 Article	 20.19(6)	 that	 any	 trademark	 applications	 that	 contains	 elements	 of	 the	protected	 GI	 shall	 be	 refused,	 and	 that	 pre-existing	 trademarks	 can	 be	 invalidated	 at	 the	request	of	an	interested	party.		Interestingly,	the	list	in	Annex	20-A	includes	cheeses	that	are	the	source	of	EU-based	frustration	(to	say	nothing	of	US	concerns)	such	as	Feta,	in	addition	to	
parmigiano	reggiano	and	mozzarella	di	bufala.	 	 The	 EU-South	Korea	 Free	 Trade	Agreement	contains	similar	terms,	albeit	allowing	for	the	co-existence	of	a	prior	trademark	under	Article	10.22,	but	preventing	the	registration	of	a	trademark	incorporating	an	element	of	a	GI	under	Article	10.23.	 	As	with	CETA,	Annex	10-A	of	the	Agreement	includes	protection	for	products	argued	by	 the	US	 to	be	generic,	 such	as	Feta.	 	According	 to	Engelhardt,	DG	Agriculture	and	Rural	 Development	 considers	 protection	 of	 GIs	 under	 a	 sui	 generis	 system	 in	 trade	agreements	 as	 a	 ‘must-have’46,	 with	 the	 EU	 pursuing	 (somewhat	 successfully)	 a	 policy	 of																																																									44	A	view	supported	by	Blakeney	(n	35)	p.16.	45 	Irene	 Calboli,	 ‘Geographical	 Indications	 of	 Origin	 at	 the	 Crossroads	 of	 Local	 Development,	 Consumer	Protection	 and	 Marketing	 Strategies’	 46	 International	 Review	 of	 Intellectual	 Property	 and	 Competition	 Law	(2015)		pp.760	et	seqq,	p.765.	46	Tim	 Engelhardt,	 ‘Geographical	 Indications	 under	 Recent	 EU	 Trade	 Agreements’	 46	 International	 Review	 of	Intellectual	Property	and	Competition	Law	(2015)	pp.781	et	seqq,	p.783.	
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‘securing	 protection	 of	 EU-based	 GIs	 through	 bilateral	 and	 regional	 general	 trade	agreements’47.	 	 In	 the	 case	of	 South	Korea,	 however,	 the	 adoption	of	 two	 trade	 agreements	that	 present	 radically	 different	 approaches	 to	 the	 issues	 of	 GI	 creates	 the	 potential	 for	significant	 regulatory	 clashes 48 ,	 as	 well	 as	 demonstrating	 the	 seemingly	 incompatible	positions	of	the	EU	and	US.	
	
IV.	What	does	this	mean	for	TTIP?	
	It	is	clear	that	the	regulatory	approaches	taken	by	the	EU	and	US	to	GIs	in	trade	agreements	differ	in	substance	and	underlying	rationale.		This	does	not	bode	well	for	future	negotiations	on	this	chapter	of	TTIP.		The	EU	has	made	it	clear	that	it	considers	GI	protection,	including	of	some	foodstuffs	that	the	US	considers	generic,	as	constituting	its	‘offensive	trade	interests’49,	including	in	Annex	I	of	its	textual	proposal	products	such	as	Feta	and	parmigiano.	 	The	EU	is	making	 its	position	clear	regarding	negotiations,	and	 indeed	prospects	 for	a	successful	deal.		Commissioner	 for	 Agriculture	 and	Rural	 Development	Hogan	 has	 stated	 that	 unless	 the	US	gives	 satisfactory	 protection	 for	 EU	 GIs,	 ‘there	will	 be	 no	 deal’50,	 and	 that	 there	will	 be	 no	sacrifice	of	GIs	‘for	the	sake	of	a	deal	with	the	US	or	anyone	else’51.		This	causes	considerable	difficulties	 for	 the	 realisation	of	 a	 successful	 deal	 –	 in	 response,	US	negotiators	have	 stated	that	 the	 EU	 ‘has	 aspirations	 for	 changing	 the	 U.S.	 system	 that	 are	 not	 going	 to	 be	 met	 in	TTIP’52.		These	views	are	supported	by	those	in	the	US	agricultural	community,	including	the	president	 of	 the	 US	 National	Milk	 Producers	 Federation,	 who	 stated	 that	 the	 GI	 issue	 ‘is	 a	horrific	overreach	by	the	EU	that	undermines	the	entire	EU	interests	in	these	negotiations	[…]	there	 won’t	 be	 a	 TTIP	 agreement	 passed	 by	 the	 Congress	 that	 is	 detrimental	 to	 U.S.	
																																																								47	ibid	p.816.	48	Billy	A	Melo	Araujo,	 ‘The	EU’s	Deep	Trade	Agenda:	Stumbling	Block	or	Stepping	Stone	Towards	Multilateral	Liberalisation?’	in	Christoph	Herrmann,	Markus	Krajewski	and	Jörg	Philipp	Terhechte	(eds),	European	Yearbook	
of	International	Economic	Law	2014	(Springer:	Berlin	2013)	p.281.	49	European	Commission,	 ‘Follow	Up	 to	 the	 Strategy	 for	 the	Protection	 and	Enforcement	 of	 IP	Rights	 in	Third	Countries	 -	 GIs’	 (2015)	 2;	 Alan	 Matthews,	 ‘Geographical	 Indications	 (GIs)	 in	 the	 US-EU	 TTIP	 Negotiations’	<http://capreform.eu/geographical-indications-gis-in-the-us-eu-ttip-negotiations/>	accessed	19	May	2016.	50	Hans	 von	 der	 Burchard,	 ‘POLITICO	 Pro’s	Morning	 Trade:	 EU	 Flexes	Muscles	 on	 Food	 Protection	 in	 TTIP	—	Wallonians	 Reject	 CETA’	 (POLITICO,	 29	 April	 2016)	 <http://www.politico.eu/newsletter/morning-trade/politico-pros-morning-trade-eu-flexes-muscles-on-food-protection-in-ttip-wallonians-reject-ceta/>	accessed	19	May	2016.	51	ibid.	52	Hans	von	der	Burchard	and	Emmet	Livingtstone,	 ‘Transatlantic	Trade	Deal	Could	Be	Bogged	down	...	by	Feta	Cheese’	 (POLITICO,	 12	 May	 2016)	 <http://www.politico.eu/article/transatlantic-trade-deal-could-be-bogged-down-by-feta-cheese-ttip-champagne/>	accessed	19	May	2016.	
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agriculture’53.		As	argued	above	in	the	previous	section,	the	incompatibilities	between	the	EU	and	 US	 on	 this	 issue	 are	 not	 ‘merely’	 economic,	 but	 represent	 two	 distinct	 legal	 and	philosophical	conceptualisations	of	the	role	and	function	of	GIs.	 	Given	such	divergences,	GIs	may	end	up	excluded	from	the	scope	of	TTIP,	or	potentially	result	in	its	abandonment.		Given	the	desire	for	regulatory	harmony	as	a	facilitator	of	increased	trade	between	the	two	regions,	neither	result	is	particularly	auspicious.				And,	to	conclude,	what	was	one	of	the	key	products	causing	such	consternation?		Feta	cheese.		
																																																								53	ibid.	
